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ABSTRACT 
In January of 1958, over a thousand Lumbee Indians of Robeson County, 
North Carolina dispersed a gathering of one hundred and fifty Ku Klux Klansmen 
under the leadership of James "Catfish" Cole. In the aftermath, national newspapers 
and magazines published feature articles applauding the Indian confrontation with the 
Klan. Only two weeks eat:lier, Robert F. Williams, president of the Monroe, North 
Carolina chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) had organized an armed confrontation with the Ku Klux Klan that received 
no national media coverage. The disparity of media attention given to the two events 
was due to the ideologies and motivations of two very different groups. The 
Lumbees resisted the imposition of a Klan doctrine that was foreign to the majority of 
11 
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Indian and White residents of Robeson County and to the actual racial infrastructure 
at the time. Williams, on the other hand, used violence to attack the racial 
foundations of Southern society-the political, social and economic stratification of 
society along racial lines. In both cases, non-White groups used violence in an 
attempt to redefine what it meant to be Indian or Black. 
This study explores the ways that North Carolinians used violence to create 
and define race. Chapter One examines the ways in which race is constructed 
through violence and the memory of violence. Chapter Two provides background on 
the Ku Klux Klan and the way that it used violence to enforce racial restrictions. 
Chapter Three presents the case of Robert Williams and the NAACP's most militant 
local chapter. Chapter Four explores the evolution of the tripartite racial system of 
Robeson County and the ways that the Lumbees interacted with their White and 
Black neighbors. Throughout, this history focuses on the use of violence to create, 
enforce and redefine racial conventions. It also examines the distribution of stories, 
pictures and souvenirs as ~method of spreading the impact of racial violence. 
INTRODUCTION 
ln January of 1958, over a thousand Lumbee Indians of Robeson County, 
North Carolina dispersed a gathering of one hundred and fifty Ku Klux Klansmen 
W1der the leadership of James "Catfish" Cole. The Lu:mbees fired shots over the 
heads of the Klansmen, who subsequently fled into the surrounding swamps. In the 
aftermath, national newspapers and magazines published feature articles applauding 
the Indian confrontation with the Klan. Only two weeks earlier, Robert F. Williams, 
president of the Monroe, North Carolina chapter of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) had organized an armed confrontation 
with the Ku Klux Klan that received no national media coverage. African American 
and Indian resistance to the Ku Klux Klan in North CaroHna in the 1950s provides a 
window into the complex construction of a three-way racial system. This disparity of 
1 
media attention given to the two events was due, in part, to the ideologies and 
motivations of two very different groups. The Lumbees resisted the imposition of a 
Klan doctrine that was foreign to the majority of Indian and White residents of 
Robeson County and to the actual racial infrastructure at the time. Williams, on the 
other hand, used violence to attack the racial foundations of Southern society- the 
political, social and economic stratification of society along racial lines. In both 
cases, non-White groups used violence in an attempt to redefine what it meant to be 
Indian or Black. 
2 
By the 1950s, America had a Long history of using social actions, including 
acts of violence, to negotiate race. Race is not a biological fact, but a set of 
characteristics that society defines in order to categorize individuals. In the century 
that followed Reconstruction, White America employed violence to define Blackness 
and to impose that definition on Black Americans. This definition of Blackness 
included restrictions on the actions of Black people. From the end of the Civil War 
through the 1950s, the main tool that White America employed to enforce these 
restrictions was organized mob violence. At one extreme, Whites hastily collected 
groups that formed temporarily in order to carry out a specific task and disbanded as 
soon as they achieved their goal. At the other end of the spectrum, the Ku Klux Klan 
created a highly organized, hierarchical and permanent society that sought to impose 
constrictions on Blacks and other groups that they defined as non-White. In each 
instance, the mob intended to repudiate Black citizenship through violence. 
3 
White America defmed and imposed race not only through acts of violence, 
but also through the creation of memories of violence. Southern Whites publicized 
graphic depictions of racial violence and broadcast them through the media. They 
created through their accounts of lynchings what historian and philosopher Pierre 
Nora has called "/ieux de memoire."1 Violence infused these "sites of memory" with 
violent racial meanings and undertones. Through the use of /ieux de memoire, the 
White community magrilfied the cultural and psychological impact of each individual 
act of violence? 
In the 1950s, James Cole's Carolina Klan drew on this historical practice of 
creating and enforcing racial categories and meanings through violence. Young 
Lumbee and Black veterans were unwilling to accept these attacks on their 
communities and fought White violence with force. The local and national White 
community sought to limit the disruption to the racial system that these violent 
altercations threatened. 
In the case of the Lurnbees, local law enforcement and government agents 
interpreted violence against the Ku Klux Klan as a strike against the disruption of the 
racial status quo. Cole's Klan had attempted to change the local system of racial 
interaction to a system that more closely resembled the climate in South Carolina and 
the local and national White community bad resisted. Conversely, in the case of 
Robert Williams and the Monroe NAACP, the Klan participated in the defense of the 
1 Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux: de Memoire," Representations 26 (Spring 
I 989), 7-25 . 
2 Hale. 209, 214. 
racial status quo. As a result, the White community united behind the Klan in 
suppression of African American dissent. 
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In both cases, the White majority used its influence to minimize the disruption 
of racial order by ostracizing radical factions. Whites reacted differently to the two 
incidents because the Lurnbees and the Monroe NAACP were fighting for two very 
different goals. The Lumbees were resisting the Klan's importation of fore ign racial 
assumptions. In this particular instance, the Lumbees were actually fighting to 
maintain the status quo against White extremists. The Lumbees did not wish to 
integrate into the White community, but neither did they wish to be denied their status 
as Indians and as non-Blacks. The national media, through their coverage of this 
event, aided the Lumbee effort to protect the complex racial balance of Robeson 
County. 
Williams, however, had been attacking the existing racial environment as 
aggressively as possible for since 1955. The concept of sixty Black veterans in 
control of a large stockpily of arms was offensive to most journalists and 
commentators. If reporters had publicized the Monroe Rifle Club's defeat of the 
Klan, they would have aided Williams in spreading his program of armed self-
defense. White reporters did not want to assume this sort of responsibility. By 
publicizing the Lumbee incident, national journalists spread the psychological impact 
ofthe event by creating national memory of the event and its meaning. 
The local and national White community attempted to maintain the separation 
of the racial categories of Black and Indian. To this end, the national media and the 
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local community celebrated the defeat of the Klan by the Lumbees, but they also 
made it clear that this message did not apply to Blacks. Even the Maxton community 
that celebrated the defeat of the Klan was concerned that others would "get the wrong 
idea."3 Thus, the national media did not disseminate the story ofRobert Williams for 
fear that it would encourage the development of Black militancy. 
By publicizing the Lumbee event and silencing Williams, local and national 
media controlled the effect of each event. The publicity the Lumbees generated 
seared the event and its meaning on the national consciousness. The media portrayed 
the Klan as a backward group that disrupted and harassed the local community. 
Conversely, the lack of attention give to Williams and the Monroe NAACP contained 
the influence of his model of armed self defense. This lack of press contained his 
influence by preventing Williams from entering the national consciousness and 
memory. 
However, Williams sought alternative channels to spread his platform and 
disseminate the parable of the Monroe NAACP. He broadcasted his story through the 
airwaves with "Radio Free Dixie" and through the mail with The Crusader. He 
thereby encouraged the subsequent growth of Black militancy during the 1960s, 
inspiring figures from Malcolm X to Huey Newton. Even though the national media 
denied him access to the national memory, Williams impressed his story and his 
beliefs on the consciousness of Blacks. While the White community was largely 
3 
" Indian Raid Knits a Carolina Town," New York Times (January 26, 1958), p. 36. 
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unaware of his existence, he reached the thinking young Blacks who would take up 
the same fight a decade later. 
The traditional history of the Civil Rights has long focused on Martin Luther 
King's non-violent mass protests and the legal assaults of the NAACP. This attention 
has excluded other segments of the African American community who were working 
in other ways for the same goals. This study explores two local racial minority 
groups that challenged racial suppression through a program of armed self-defense. 
Further, the hlstory of Civi I Rights has focused on national events and 
movements. The legal victories of the NAACP and the mass movement engineered 
by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference are well documented. But 
historians know much less about the ideologies and actions of independent local 
organizations and communities. It is necessary to examine these groups in order to 
properly assess the impact of the national organizations and leaders.4 
This study will explore the ways that North Carolinians used violence to 
create and define race. Chapter One will examine the ways in which race is 
constructed through violence and the memory of violence. Chapter Two will provide 
background on the Ku Klux Klan and the way that it used violence to enforce racial 
restrictions. Chapter Three will explore the evolution of the tripartite racial system of 
Robeson County and the ways that the Lumbees interacted with their White and 
Black neighbors. Chapter Four will present the case of Robert Williams and the 
4 Armstead L. Robinson and Patricia Sullivall, eds., New Directions in Civil Rights Studies 
(Charlottesville: University Press ofVirginia, 1991), p. 2. 
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NAACP's most militant local chapter. Tluoughout, this history will focus on the use 
of violence to create, enforce and redefine racial conventions. It will also examine 
the distribution of stories, pictures and souvenirs as a way to spread the impact of 
racial violence. 
CHAPTER ONE: 
"INFERIOR CLASSES OF BEINGS" 
VIOLENCE, MEMORY AND THE CREATION OF RACE 
When the Lu:mbees gathered to disperse Cole's Klan rally in 1958 and when 
Robert Williams organized the Monroe NAACP in order to violently confront a Klan 
motorcade, each group used violence as a tool to redefine the meaning of race in 
North Carolina. Race is a social trait that societies have constantly redefined to fit 
changing circumstances . . Both groups drew on a long American history of social 
negotiation over the deftnition and interpretation of race. Further, both groups 
attempted to use the media to increase the inf1uence of their victory. By creating 
national memory of their defeat of the Klan, the Lumbees redefined what it meant to 
be Indian. In denying equitable press coverage to Williams, the national media 
contained the meaning of Williams' victory and protected the established meaning of 
Blackness. 
8 
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By the 1950s, Americans bad a long history of using social interactions, 
including violent acts, to define race. Society, through mundane interactions and 
negotiations, define race and racial categories. Race is not a biological fact, but a set 
of characteristics that society defines in order to categorize individuals. Furthermore, 
the borders of races are fluid and changeable. The meaning of race is contingent on 
environment, time, place, class, gender, religion and nationality. US case law 
includes fifty-one examples of how the courts have taken an active role in 
determining the race of individuals.5 An individual may be assigned to one racial 
category at one time and place and a different category in another time and place. 
Finally, race conflates inherited genetic traits with acquired cultural traits. The 
biological trait of skin color is mistakenly seen as an indicator for acquired skills and 
attributes, such as personality, intelligence and temperament. 
In the past thirty years, scientists have abandoned the theory of race because 
of flaws in the definition of the concept. First, racial distinctions are not 
reproducible. If one person classifies a set of people into races using a predetermined 
set of criteria, another person using the same criteria should be able to classify the 
same set of people in the same way. However, racial classification depends as much 
on the experiences of the person doing the classification as on the morphological 
5 Ian Haney-Lopez, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race (New York: New York University 
Press, 1996), 49. 
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traits of the classified. For this reason, the majority of biologists have concluded that 
race is a social construct rather than a scientific fact.6 
While the social ly constructed categories of race do not describe biological 
traits, they are nonetheless important for observing the cultural, political and 
economic structures that define and enforce racial descriptions and prohibitions. 
Thus, this study assumes that race and races are socially established fact. Following 
Ian Haney-Lopez, I will capitalize "White" and "Black" in order to signify that these 
are not neutral descriptors of race or skin color, but socially constructed categories of 
political, legal , economic and social existence and identity.7 
Through much of the history of the United States individuals and institutions 
have assumed that race is essentially natural and unchanging. Those attempting to 
define race through the establishment of hierarchical racial categories have viewed 
this activity as an attempt to discover natural law. The prime example of this mode of 
reasoning is the theory known as Social Darwinism. This school 's main proponent, 
Herbert Spencet:, proclaime~ that the different races of the human species " [came] 
down from those pre-historic times during which the diffusion of mankind and 
differentiation of the varieties of man, took place."8 These races, while evolving into 
various societies, changed only incrementally due to varieties in environmental 
6 George J. Armelagos and Alan H. Goodman, "Race, Racism and Anthropology;" in Alan H. 
Goodman and Thomas L. Leatherman, ed., Building a New Bioculhlral Synthesis: Political-Economic 
Perspectives on Human Biology (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1998), 364-
370. 
7 Haney-Lopez, xiv. 
8 Herbert Spencer, On Social Evolution: Selected Writings {Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1972), 161. 
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pressures. Each race developed a specific set of social and biological characteristics 
in response to their requirements for survival. For example, Spencer noted that " that 
superiority of sight which enables a Bushman to see further with the naked eye than a 
European with a telescope, is fully paralleled by the European's more perfect 
intellectual vision."9 Spencer believed that these racial characteristics could only 
evolve over many generations. Even in the case of intermarriage between two 
members of different races, " the conflicting tendencies towards different social types, 
now exist in the same individual. The half-caste, inheriting from one line of ancestry 
proclivities adapted to one set of institutions, and from the other line of ancestry 
proclivities adapted to another set of institutions, is not fit for either."10 Thus, the 
dominant belief in America was that members of the White race were fully fit for 
citizenship in the modern state, while those who traced even part of their ancestry to a 
non-White race were not fit for citizenship. 
The historically conditioned assumption that race is biologically determined 
has rarely beeJ:l questioned. For example, the 1980 Supreme Court decision in 
Fullilove v. Klutznick includes the definition of various races, including the definition 
of a "Negro [as] an individual of the black race of African origin."11 The 
predominant view in America to this day is that race is a constant and natural 
ingredient of an individual's identity. Despite the evidence that race is socially 
constructed, many modern histories of the Klan also assume that race is biological 
9 Spencer, 7. 
10 Spencer, 163. 
11 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 US Supreme Court {1980). 
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fact. Wyn Craig Wade's indispensable narra6ve history The Fiery Cross consistently 
treats racial categories as constants. Wade uses the terms "White" and "Black" with 
no explanation of how society defined these categories. Though Wade thoroughly 
illuminates the narrative of the Klan's existence, he fai ls to explore the ways that the 
Klan manufactured and enforced racial de:finitions. 12 
However, in the past thirty years, critical race theory has challenged this 
notion by defining race as a socially constructed phenomenon. This school of thought 
challenges traditional notions of race by pointing to cases in which legal and 
extralegal actors have used various criteria to determine an individual's race. In 
White by Law, Ian Haney-Lopez examines American case law that has categorized 
race, determined the boundaries of different races and defined the meanings of 
various races. In 1790, Congress restricted citizenship to "White persons."13 
Thereafter, various cases have forced the American judiciary to determine whether or 
not a specific person is White or non-White. The courts held that persons from 
Mexico and A.nnenia wen:~ White, while persons from Hawaii, China, Japan, Burma 
and the Philippines were not. Various courts also made contradictory decisions in the 
cases of persons from Syria, India and Arabia. 14 In addition to their role in 
determining who was White and who was not, the courts also participated in defining 
the meaning of racial categories such as White, non-White, Black and Indian. For 
12 Wyn Craig Wade, The Fiery Cross: The Ku Klux Klan in America (London: SLmon and Schuster, 
1987). 
13 Act of March 26, 1790, Statutes at Large 1, ch. 3, I 03 ( 1790); quoted in Haney-Lopez, 1. 
14 Haney-Lopez, 2. 
13 
example, in Dred Scott v. John F.A. Sandford, the Supreme Court accepted the 
defendant' s argument that Dred Scott was a "negro slave, the lawful property of the 
defendant" and that the defendant, being a White citizen was entitled to hold title over 
and physically restrain the plaintiff. Further, the cow1 pondered the question of 
"whether the descendants of. .. slaves, when they shall be emancipated, or who are 
born of parents who had become free before their birth, are citizens of a State, in the 
sense in which the word citizen is used in the Constitution of the United States." The 
Court concluded that "they are not, and that they are not included, and were not 
intended to be included, under the word ' citizens' in the Constitution, and can 
therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for 
and secures to citizens of the United States." The Court defined individuals of 
African descent as an "inferior class of beings" that were therefore incapable of 
assuming the rights and obligations of citizenship. This expansive decision defmed 
the Black race and establ ished the characteristics of the members of this race. 15 
While case law is the most thoroughly documented method of constructing 
race, courts generally reflected the racial theories that American culture had 
previously accepted. Americans define race through their everyday interactions with 
each other-through the nearly imperceptible defmition and coercive imposition of 
economic, political and social custom. The overarching structure of race could not 
15 Dred Scott, Plaintiff in Error, v. John F.A. Sandford, 393 US Supreme Court (1856). 
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exist if individuals did not create, recreate and articulate racial categories and 
meanings in the everyday. 16 
American racial definitions have been produced by the violent enforcement of 
custom. During slavery, White Americans violently imposed their will upon Blacks 
through the tyrannical discipline of the plantation. This violence contributed to the 
determination of who was Black. The definition of Blackness, as seen in Scott v. 
Sanford, rested largely on the historical fact of s]avery. White slave owners enforced 
this fact daily through violence or the threat of violence. The courts participated by 
codifying the right to use such violence. In Scott v. Sanford, the court drew on a 1705 
Massachusetts law that provided "if any negro or mulatto shall presume to smite or 
strike any person of the English or other Christian nation, such negro or mulatto shall 
be severely whipped."17 Americans defined race through violence and enacted 
statutes that reinforced the established racial categories. 
White America employed violence to define precisely what it meant to be 
Black. The definition of Blackness produced during slavery included the "Old 
Negro," the loyal, loving and patiently suffeting servant. Whites contrasted this 
romanticized depiction of the happy slave with a conception of a violent savage with 
no respect for civil ization. According to historian Grace Elizabeth Hale, Whites later 
included in the latter category the "black beast rapist," popularized by D.W. Griffith's 
16 Thomas C. Holt, " Marking: Race, Race-making and the Writing of History," American Historical 
Review (February 1995), 8-14. 
17 Holt, 8-14. 
15 
film Birth of a Nation. 18 White ·America used this fearsome character to justify the 
imposition of restrictive codes of segregation and violence. The latter category 
included Blacks who strove to better their economic, social and political standing. 
The stereotype essentially included any Black who did not conform to the 
expectations and restrictions of White society. 
During the antebellum era, America denied Black people the freedoms and 
privileges of citizenship, including the right to vote, sue, hold political office and 
defend themselves from violence. Blacks also faced restrictions aimed against their 
establishing economically successful businesses. The passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1868 abolished the White South's legal and institutional methods of 
enforcing these restrictions. In response, White Southerners sought extralegal means 
of enforcing these strictures. During the century that followed Reconstruction, White 
America employed violence to define Blackness and to impose that definition on 
Black Americans. This definition of Blackness included restrictions on the actions of 
those determined to be Black. The main tool that White America employed to 
enforce these restrictions was organized mob violence. ln each instance, the mob 
intended to violently repudiate Black citizenship. 
White America created race not only through acts of violence, but also 
through the creation of memories of violence. Southern Whites publicized graphic 
depictions of racial violence and broadcast them through the media. They created, 
111 Grace Elizabeth Hale, Making Whiteness: The Culture ofSegregation in the South, 1890-1940 (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1998), 73. 
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through the locations of their violence and the collection oflynching souvenirs, "sites 
of memory" that housed violent racial meanings and undertones. White participants 
and spectators also stored these memories of violence in objects. They collected, 
traded and displayed the body parts of lynching victims in order to recall the 
enforcement of racial codes. These objects recalled to Blacks the consequences of 
protesting the Southern racial environment. Through the use of lieux de memoire, the 
White community magnified the cultural and psychological impact of each individual 
act of violence. 19 
During the 1950s, the Lumbees and Williams' Monroe NAACP used violence 
and the creation of memory to redefine racial categories. By achieving national 
notoriety for their defeat of the Klan, the Lumbees created national awareness and 
memory of the event. This allowed them to defme the Indian community as able to 
protect its members and to stand up to the excesses of white racism. In the case of 
Williams, the national press was troubled by the thought of a group of black men in 
control of a large quantity_ofweapons and willing to use them against White men. In 
defending the Black community from the Klan, Williams changed the existing 
definition of the Black man. He claimed the right of armed self defense and the right 
to refuse to accept White violence. 
19 Hale. 209, 214. 
CHAPTER TWO 
"KU KLUX CONSPIRACY": 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF RACIAL SEGREGATION, 1866-1957 
In the century that foJlowed the Civil Wax, white society used mob violence to 
construct and enforce race. The most thoroughly developed organizations, such as 
the Ku Klux Klan, developed a sophlsticated set of hierarchies, regalia and official 
functions. The Klan used these instruments to enforce racial restrictions through 
violence and the threat of violence. In times when the Klan's influence waned, white 
North Carolinians collected as ad hoc vigilantes who assembled for a specific act and 
dispersed upon its completion. By the 1950s, North Caxolinians had a long history of 
using violence to negotiate race. Williams and the Lumbees both drew on this history 
in order to combat racial restrictions. 
Racial violence in North Caxolina from 1866 through the 1950s revolved 
around the many incarnations of the Ku Klux Klan. In l 866, in the dreary crossroads 
17 
18 
town of Pulaski, Tennessee, six Confederate veterans, lacking jobs or any other 
meaningful diversion, set out to alleviate their boredom. They decided to establish a 
club that would play pranks on local residents. A committee of three members was 
charged with deciding upon an appropriate name before their second meeting. All 
they came up with was "the circle." John Kennedy, one of the founding members, 
proposed that they at least translate circle into the Greek kuklos. Since the residents 
of the area were mainly Scottish, they added klan?° For the next year and a half, the 
Klan diverted itself with initiating new members, playing practical jokes on their 
neighbors (especially local freedmen). For example, contemporary historians John C. 
Lester and D. L. Wilson relate a ubiquitous tale of Klan chicanery in their 1884 Ku 
Klux Klan that involved a Klansman appearing at the door of "some negro needing a 
wholesome impression." The Klansman would then ask for a bucket of water and 
pretend to drink it while actually pouring it into a sack under his robe. The Klansman 
would then say "That's ... the first drink of water I have had since I was ki lled at 
Shiloh."2 1 The Klan intended these juvenile pranks as a method of scaring Blacks 
who took advantage of the privileges of citizenship. 
The victory of Republicans and Blacks in the Tennessee election of August 
1867 politicized the Klan and caused them to turn to violence as a more potent 
method of enforcing racial restrictions. Leading up to the election, Conservatives-a 
20 Wade, 33. 
21 John C. Lester and D. L. Wilson, Ku Klux Klan: It 's Origin, Growth and Disbandment (New York: 
AMS Press, 1884); reprinted in Walter L. Fleming, Documentary Hist01y of Reconstruction: Political, 
Military, Social, Religious, Educational and Industrial, 1865- the Present Time (Gloucester, 
Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1960), 369. 
19 
coalition of Democrats and old-time Whigs- urged freedmen to trust in their former 
masters to run government. After Republicans won a resounding victory in the 
election, the Klan retaliated against Blacks and the White organizers who encouraged 
them to vote Republican. The Union League, a group ofNortherners who traveled to 
the South during Reconstruction, bore the brunt of the Klan's rage. Created to enable 
freedmen to integrate into society, the League had become an arm of the Republican 
Party. According to the Klan, without this "society which teaches the negro to hate 
his former master," the freedmen would not have abandoned the traditional order of 
the South. 22 The Klan quickly spread and established local chapters throughout 
Tennessee. A member of the Tennessee legislature reported that there was "an 
organized body of men, who, without provocation and in violation of Law-
seemingly desperate in purpose- are scouring the county by night, carrying dismay 
and horror to all."23 The leaders of the Klan attempted to use the violence of local 
Klansmen in order to maintain racial restrictions through intimidation. 
Following the 1867 election, the Klan held a formal meeting in Nashville in 
order to formalize their rules, regulations and hierarchy in their Prescript.24 Several 
weeks later, Klan officials offered the position of Grand Wizard (the ruler of all of the 
Klans) to former Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest. Forrest had suffered 
for the cause; after the Civil War, he described himself as "completely used up ... 
22 Nashville Union and Dispatch (April 24, 1868); quoted in Wade, 45. 
23 W. Bosson to Gen. George H. Thomas, March 5, 1868, Andrew Johnson Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C; quoted in Wade, 46. 
24 Wade, 40. 
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shot all to pieces, crippled up and ... completely dependant." 25 Forrest had lost 
everything in the war. "I went into the Army worth a million and a half dollars, and 
carne out a beggar," he lamented? 6 He saw the Klan as a way for the South to 
recover and also saw it as a tool to revive his personal fortunes. 
Upon Forrest's assumption of leadership, the Klan stepped up their activities. 
"The object of the organization," Forrest claimed, "was to prevent a general slaughter 
of [White] women and children, and to prepare themselves to resist anything of the 
kind."27 Forrest asserted that White Southerners were concemed about racial unrest 
because of the influence ofNorthemers. "When the war was over our servants began 
to mix with the republicans," he recalled. "There was a general fear throughout the 
country that there would be an uprising."28 Forrest believed that Northern interlopers 
were the cause of the discord between races was widespread in the White South. 
Unsurprisingly, Black Southerners gave their allegiance to the Republican 
Party in order to gain political, legal and economic rights. A delegation of South 
Carolina Bla9ks issued ap "Address to the Native Whites": 
[You] derided the idea of granting us the right to vote; when your legislature 
met in 1865-66, you passed that infamous Black Code. . . . Your laws 
provided for the taking and binding-out our children and subjecting us to aJI 
manner of disabilities. We could not pursue any trade or calling in tbis State 
without written permission from some white man; we could not sell any 
article of barter without the consent first obtained from some magistrate. 
25 Nathan Bedford Forrest. "Testimony Before the Committee," U.S. Congress, Joint Select 
Committee, Testimony taken by the Joint Select Committee to inquire into The Condition of Affairs in 
the Late Insurrectionary States (hereafter referred to as Ku Klux Conspiracy) (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1872), 24. 
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With all these facts before us, and your negro code before us ... do you not 
see why we have been constrained to trust in strangers rather than to those 
who claim that they are our natural friends? Can you have the heart to ask 
colored men to vote for men who deny that they are capable of voting 
intelligently? Can you ask us to vote our liberties away forever? Can you ask 
us to sustain a party which is pledged to divest us of all the privileges in law 
which we now enjoy?29 
White Southerners refused to accept that Blacks made an independent and rational 
decision to support the Republican Party in response to the racial and political 
environment. They instead chose to believe that Northern Republicans deluded 
Blacks into supporting their platform. Most White Southerners believed that Blacks 
were incapable of thinking rationally. Instead of accepting the Blacks' use of the vote 
as evidence of their rationality, White Southerners instead used violence in order to 
force Blacks to conform to their expectations. 
Following the 1867 convention, the Klan enacted new chapters in North 
Carolina and attempted to circumvent the Reconstruction government by using 
violence to enforce Southern racial restrictions. William W. Holden, the Republican 
governor pfNorth C~olina, observed that 
under the leadership of ambitious and discontented politicians and under the 
pretext that society needed to be regulated by some authority outside or above 
the law. . . [T]hose secret Klans began to commit murder, to rob, whip 
scourge, and mutilate unoffending citizens.30 
29 
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The Klan in North Carolina used violence and fear to circumvent the Reconstruction 
government and enforce traditional Southern racial restrictions. 
The historical record from the late 1860s is strewn with reports of Klan 
violence. Lynching was their usual mode of operation as they Uttered the countryside 
with the charred, mutilated bodies of their victims.31 For example, in one 
congressional district of Alabama, from 1868-71, there were reports of371 cases of 
violence, thirty-five murders and six churches burned.32 The uncontrolled violence of 
local Klans shocked even prominent Klansmen and their supporters. 
Forrest himself was troubled by his lack of power over and even lack of 
communication with the local Klans. In 1869, he issued "General Order Number 
One," which formally abolished the Klan because "(it] is in some localities being 
perverted from its original honorable and patriotic purposes. "33 It is unlikely that 
Forrest intended to prevent further activity from the Klans, but he did intend to wash 
his hands of the business. Forrest's Order did not reduce the Klan's activity. If 
anything, violent acts inc~eased because of the lack of any moderating influence from 
leadership. 
This violence had dramatic political implications as Conservatives prevented 
Blacks and Republicans from voting through violence and threats. In the spring 
election of 1868 in Georgia's Oglethorpe County, Republicans received more than 
31 Wade, 54-79. 
32 DuBois, 494. 
33 Susan Lawrence Davis, Authentic Hist01y Ku Klux Klan, 1865-1877 (New York: American Library 
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1,1 00 votes. By the time of the presidential election in November, 1868, they 
received 11 6. In Columbia County over the same period, Republican votes fell from 
11 22 votes to one vote.34 In the election of 1870, Conservatives gained control of the 
legislature in North Carolina. The state's Republican Governor, William Holden, 
offered a picture of the situation his annual message of 1870: "Grand juries in many 
counties frequently refused to find bills against the members of this Klan for the 
gravest and most flagrant violations of the law."35 Later that year he wrote to 
President Ulysses Grant that the Klan "conspiracy is in existence in every county of 
the State. And its aim is to obtain the control of the government. It is believed that 
its leaders now direct the movements of the present Legislature."36 Holden implored 
the federal government to take action to stop the growing conspiracy. 
The Klan replaced the deceased legal enforcement of racial suppression in 
direct opposition of the federal government and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Congress responded by appointing a select committee to investigate the Klan.37 On 
March 23, 1971 , Grant p~rsonally intervened in the Congressional debate and 
demanded the passage of a biJI that would grant the executive the authority to 
forceful ly deal with the Klan. Grant explained to Congress that the Southern states 
34 David M. Chalmers, Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan (New York: Franklin 
Watts, 1965), 15-6. 
35 U.S. Congress, Senate, Governor Wimam W. Holden, 41st Cong., 3rd Sess., Congressional Globe 
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contained an environment hostile to the constitutional rights to life and property and 
to federal tax collectors and even mailmen. Believing that the states were incapable 
of addressing this problem, Grant urgently requested "such legislation as in the 
judgment of Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property and the 
enforcement of law in all parts of the United States."38 Congress responded and on 
April 20, 1871 President Grant signed, An Act to enforce the Provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, later known as the Ku 
Klux Act.39 The Act provided that any person who deprived another of 
constitutional "rights, privileges, or immunities ... to be prosecuted in the several 
di strict or circuit courts of the United States." Thus, prosecutions of Klansmen were 
removed from local and state courtrooms that had been infiltrated by the Klan. The 
Act also declared the Klan to be "a rebeJlion against the government of the United 
States." This allowed the executive to suspend habeas corpus and to use the military 
h . . 40 to suppress t e msurrect10n. 
The Ku .Klux Act p~ovided Grant with a legal mechanism for attacking the 
Klan. Acting upon Attorney General Amos T. Akerman's advice, President Grant 
suspended the writ of habeas corpus on October 17, 1871. Federal marshals, in 
cooperation with the Seventh Cavalry under Major Lewis W. Merrill, began filling 
the local jails with Klansmen. Several hundred Klansmen, especially the leaders of 
38 U.S. Congress, Message from the President, Relative to the Condition of Affairs in the South, 42 
Cong., I Sess .. House Exec. Doc. No. 14, 1871 ; quoted in Wade. 89. 
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the order, fled before they could be arrested. According to the New York Times, the 
"stampede ... [which included] a number against whom there is no evidence, and no 
charge save their accusing consciences ... , revealed the extent and ramifications of 
the Order even more clearly than the evidence." With the flight of their leaders, rank 
and file Klansmen bitterly realized that thei r favorite tactics of avoiding justice would 
not work and many of them confessed. They also "express[ed] great indignation at 
the escape of many of the leaders of the order, leaving them to suffer the bm-dens of 
fine and imprisonment."41 The arrests spread havoc through the county as nearly 
every family was affected. Approximately two hundred men were incarcerated in 
York County and more than five hundred more had surrendered, confessed and been 
released. Twenty turned state's evidence and six requested to be arrested in order to 
protect themselves from retribution.42 Most importantly, the government had 
instigated the betrayal of the rank and file by their leaders, dividing the Klan.43 
Unfortunately for the federal government, Congress had provided the legal but 
not the financial tools for dealing with the Klan. The multitude of Klan cases soon 
overwhelmed the Justice Department and the federal court system. Akerman decided 
to prosecute only the most egregious offenders, while those whose participation in the 
Klan' s activity was marginal or at all questionable were released on bail. Despite the 
failure of federal prosecution, the government's actions had effectively dispersed the 
Klan in South Carolina. As Southerners realized that Klan activity might provoke 
41 
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federal military action, Klans in other states followed suit and ceased their activities.44 
However, the motives of the Klan would be debated for the next century. 
Histories of Reconstruction produced during the early twentieth century 
declared that the Ku Klux Klan developed in order to counter the intrusion of 
Reconstruction governments composed of Blacks and Northerners. In 1901, historian 
and futme President Woodrow Wilson recalled that " there had sprung into existence a 
great Ku Klux Klan, an 'Invisible Empire of the South,' bound together in loose 
organization to protect the southern country from some of the ugliest hazards of a 
time of revolution" [emphasis original].45 In 1905, political scientist John W. 
Burgess concluded that the Klans intended to replace the state's control of race that 
the South had lost in the Civil War. Burgess opined that with the enactment of 
Reconstruction, "Congress turned the tables upon the Southern White people, and 
placed the ignorant barbarians in political control of them. . . It was ... rather natural, 
though not praiseworthy, that men should have bound themselves together by secret 
oaths to do anything an~ everything in their power to defeat this blunder-crime 
against civilization."46 In 1929, historian Claude G. Bowers compared the 
development of the Ku Klux Klan to the vigilance committees that were formed in 
areas of the West to maintain order where available law enforcement was inadequate 
or non-existent. "ln the pioneer West, vigilance committees were formed for the 
44 Wade, 102-4. 
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protection of horses and cattle; in the South, the Klan was organized for the 
protection of women, property, civilization itself.'"'7 By 1930, the glorification of the 
Reconstruction Ku Klux Klan was an established tradition. 
One of the first critics of this interpretation of the Klan was a young 
Indochinese man named Nguyen Sinh Cung who lived in France and traveled to the 
United States several times during the 1920s. Cung, writing for the French periodical 
Correspondance lnternalionale, was appalled by Americans' treatment of African 
Americans. "After sixty-five years of so-called emancipation, American Negroes still 
endure atrocious moral and material sufferings, of which the most cruel and horrible 
is the custom of lynching.'"'8 After the creation and popularization of the Klan, Cung 
reported that the "agrarian and slave-owning bourgeoisie saw in the Klan a useful 
agent, almost a savior. They gave it all the help in their power." However, the White 
elites soon found that once unleashed, the violent hordes could not be properly 
controlled. "In the space of three years it committed so many crimes and misdeeds 
that a number of those who supported it left in horror. "49 Cung went on to elaborate 
many of these horrors to his French audience. He reported that due to the "Ku Klux 
Klan, and other secret societies, the illegal and barbarous practice of lynching is 
spreading and continuing widely in the States of the American Union." Cung detailed 
the scene of a lynching: "Imagine a furious horde. Fists clenched, eyes b loodshot, 
47 Claude G. Bowers, The Tragic Era: The Revolution after Lincoln (Cambridge, MA: The Riverside 
Press, 1929), 309. 
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mouths foaming, yells, insuJts, curses ... This horde is transported with the wild 
delight of a crime to be committed without risk." Cung provided a Marxist 
framework for viewing the rise of the Ku Klux Klan that wouJd be echoed by 
historians a decade later. By that time Cung had returned to Indochina and changed 
his name to Ho Chi Minh. 5° 
In the 1935, historian W.E.B. DuBois suggested that economic and political 
motivations were much more important in the Klan' s development than politics. 
DuBois characterized the Klan and other such groups as "secret Democratic 
organizations" intent on preventing Republicans from winning elections. :5 1 DuBois 
also asserted that the Klan was primarily an economic response of capital to labor. 
Wealthy White business owners defused tension with White laborers by redirecting 
their restlessness against Blacks. "Planters, united in secret organizations with poor 
Whites, were determined to reduce the labor vote by disfranchising the Negro."52 
Klansmen formed bands that roamed the countryside attacking Blacks for almost any 
imaginable reas9n. DuBois. reports that the 
''reasons for such outrages were significantly varied: the victims should suffer 
in revenge for killing, and for some cases of arson; they were Republicans; 
they were radical; they had attempted to hold elections; they were carrying 
arms; they were ' niggers' ; they were 'damn niggers' ; they boasted that they 
would own land; they should be made to recant Republican principles; and 
they should give desired information."53 
From economic and political origins, the Klan descended into uncontrolled violence. 
50 Wade, 202-4. 
51 DuBois. 474. 
52 DuBois, 483. 
53 DuBois, 676-7. 
29 
While there may be some truth to DuBois' interpretation, the main impetus for 
organizing the Klan was to suppress Blacks by the reimposing the racial defmitions 
that Republicans had attempted to erase during Reconstruction. Through the Klan, 
Southerners imposed these definitions through masked force in much the same way 
that they had openly done so during slavery. Violence was still central to the creation 
of race. Many of the same forms of violence used during slavery, such as binding, 
whipping, beating and even killing, remained the same after the Civil War. Whites 
inflicted this violence in order to resist the redefinition ofrace by Blacks and by the 
Union. The objective of the Klan was to limit Blacks' access to education, suffrage 
and the courts. 
In the decade following the defeat of the Klan, Radical Reconstruction would 
also fail. The presence of a clandestine conspiracy to suppress the laws of the United 
States had fueled Northern support of the Republican Party. In the absence of the Ku 
Klux Klan, Northern support for Reconstruction waned. When the Democrats 
reclaimed the House of Representatives in 1874, it was clear that support for 
Reconstruction was on the wane. 54 Three years later, the infamous bargain that 
elected Rutherford B. Hayes also ended Reconstruction. In the following decades, 
the North and the Republican Party effectively abandoned the cause of racial equality. 
Southern states thorougWy legislated and codified racial segregation. The Supreme 
Court overturned many of the statutes passed by Congress during Reconstruction, 
including most of the Ku Klux Act in 1883. The Court also chipped away at the 
s
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implications of the Fowteenth Amendment by allowing states to introduce restrictions 
on voting and other rights. The Klan, meanwhile, lay dormant and may never have 
been heard from again if not for a peculiar combination of events, the most important 
of which was a popular portrayal of the Reconstruction Klan. 
On January 8, 1915, a motion picture premiered in Los Angeles that would 
soon spur a national debate, provoke race riots and tarnish the reputation of the 
President. D.W. Griffith's The Birth of a Nation portrayed Radical Reconstruction as 
a dark day in American history when one section of the nation maliciously imposed 
its vindictive will upon another. It reiterated the ugly racial characterizations of 
Blacks that White Southerners had popularized. Perhaps most importantly, it pictured 
the Klan as a protective organization that rode to the rescue of the impugned dignity 
of the South. 
In 1915, William Joseph Simmons, an itinerant district manager of the 
fraternal "Woodsmen of America" and erstwhile Methodist preacher, was bedridden 
and forlorn. That spring .he had been hit by a streetcar in Atlanta. During his three 
month recovery, Simmons began dreaming of fraternity and companionship. Upon 
hearing of the success of The Birth of a Nation, Simmons took an active interest in 
the Klan. He obtained and revised a copy of the 1867 Prescript. On October 26, 
1915, Simmons and 34 fellow comrades applied for and received a charter from the 
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State of Georgia for the "Knights ofthe Ku Klux Klan" as a "purely benevolent and 
eleemosynary" fraternal order. 55 
Despite all of the trends in favor of the Klan, Simmons was onJy able to attract 
5,000-6,000 members from 1915-1920.56 Simmons had assembled the mechanisms 
for the Klans success, but he was unable to sell the Klan. Simmons sought help from 
Edward Young Clarke and Elizabeth Tyler, two advertising professionals, in order to 
spread the appeal of the Invisible Empire. 
Much of the Klan's success can be attributed to the innovative and effective 
financial organization implemented in 1920 by Clarke and Tyler. The Klan required 
each member to pay an initiation fee (a "klectoken") of$10. 57 Simmons essentially 
contracted out the management of the klectokens to Clarke and Tyler. Of the $10 
membership, $2 went into the treasury of the Klan. Clarke and Tyler retained the 
remaining $8, of which they paid $4 to the kleagle (an organizer or field worker58) 
who had recruited the initiate, $1 went to the head kleagle of the state, $0.50 went to 
the Grand Goblin (the O':"erseer of all the kleagles in a domain, or group of states), and 
Clarke and Tyler retained the remaining $2.50.59 
The financial incentive encouraged the kleagles to adapt the political and 
social program of the Klan to each local community's issues, conflicts and problems. 
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Since 1970, a wealth of scholarship has explored the many permutations of the Klan 
and the populations they attracted. ln general, this scholarship has demonstrated that 
local issues determined the nature of local Klans and that the membership of the local 
Klans were generally reflective of the native White Protestant community in the 
area.60 
The fmancial reorganization and adaptability of the Klan had a dramatic 
impact on the organization's growth rate. During 1922, Klan membership grew from 
one hundred thousand Knights to one million.61 At its peak in 1924, the Klan claimed 
between three and six million Americans.62 The Klan claimed many officials of state, 
local and national government as members, and even inducted President Warren G. 
Harding into the Klan in the White House Green Room.63 
However, the system that brought the Klan success also contributed to its 
downfall. The Klan generated an enormous volume of wealth not only for the 
individual members, but also for the organization. The Klan collected $8 million in 
revenue for the fiscal yeaJ" 1923-4, but only recorded a balance of only $664,091. 
Inadequate documentation obscures the path of this money, but it can reasonably be 
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assumed that a substantial percentage flowed into the pockets of local and national 
officers. 64 
Conflict within the Ku Klux Klan also produced bad press that damaged the 
organization.65 Klan leader Hiram W. Evans fired North Carolina' s popular Grand 
Wizard, Judge Henry A. Grady in 1927. Grady had exercised a restraining influence 
in North Carolina and had opposed the national organization's efforts to raise funds 
and engage in pol itics. The conflict created a schism in the state organization and the 
Raleigh Klan, where the state organization was centered, disbanded. Many Klansmen 
left the order, and membership dropped from a high of approximately fifty thousand 
to around eight thousand in 1927.66 Financial scandals, along with high profile 
factionalism in North Carolina and other states, led to the downfall of the Klan by the 
end of the 1920s. 
While the Klan remained largely silent throughout the Depression and World 
War IT, racial violence in North Carolina continued largely unabated. White 
Southerners used l ynchi~g a tool to impose racial restrictions during this time. Lynch 
law had a long tradition in the southern United States as an extralegal system of 
enforcing order. During Reconstruction, the Klan used lynching to maintain the 
racial order. Lynching occurred more frequently in the 1890s than in any other 
decade. However, the rituals of lynching became much more formalized and 
publicized through the 1930s. White mobs generally showed high levels of 
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organization and premeditation. Newspaper advertisements appeared several days 
before the Whites planned to take action and in many cases, organizers chartered 
private train coaches to transport the mob to the planned location of the lynching. 
Local authorities were complicit in mob action, as they relinquished the prisoner in 
their charge at the hint of an unruly gathering.67 The majority of the White 
community participated in lynching, either directly or by participating in the retelling 
of the narrative. 
In addition to furthering awareness of_the event, large numbers of participants 
and spectators also provided anonymity. Where the Klan bad used hoods and robes, 
the mobs of the 1930s relied on their size to protect their identity. ln general, local 
authorities accepted (and in some cases promoted) lynching as an inevitable reaction 
of the Southern community to the Black victim's alleged crime. Since a large 
percentage of the community participated in the lynchjng, law enforcement would 
have had a difficult time bringing all of the participants to justice. Local authorities 
neglected lo prosecute th~ participants, either because of the difficulty or due to their 
support ofthe violence. 
Lynching replaced the Klan in the social operation of the South by enforcing 
the racial codes through violence and the threat of violence. Newspapers published 
accounts that described the motive of the lynchers and the real and imagined crimes 
of their victim. This publicity threatened Blacks and enforced the observance of the 
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social order and the rules of society. 68 In order to further the impact of the event, the 
organizers of a lynching also attempted to draw large numbers of participants and 
spectators. Participants also actively collected, sold and traded souvenirs from 
lynchings, such as body parts, instruments of torture and even picture postcards. 69 
This practice further spread the message and meaning of the lynching by creating 
objects that helped a transitory event to live on through the recollection of its 
details.70 
Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, Southerners used ad hoc mobs to 
enforce racial restrictions and Klan membership continued to dwindle. During the 
Depression, few potential klansmen could afford the $10 klectoken. Upon the United 
States' entrance into World War ll, most Americans were more concerned with 
German and Japanese enemies than the perceived Black, Catholic and Communist 
enemies of the Klan. 71 Furthermore, the existence of an organization working 
covertly to suppress the rights of Americans contradicted the government' s campaign 
to spread democracy in~ernationally. During World War II, president FrankJjn 
Delano Roosevelt feared that the Klan threatened national unity and international 
support.72 The final nail in the Klan' s coffin came from the Internal Revenue Service 
in the spring of 1944. Marion Allen, an IRS agent working out of Atlanta, Georgia, 
presented Imperial Wizard James A. Colescott with a bill for $685,000 in back taxes 
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on Klan revenues. 73 According to Colescott, the Klan "voted to suspend the 
constitutional laws of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc. , to revoke all charter 
KJans and to order disbandment of all provisional K.lans." However, Colescott 
reserved the right to "meet and reincarnate at any time." 74 
The end of World War II brought the revival of the Ku Klux Klan. In mid-
May, 1946, seven hundred Klansmen gathered atop Georgia's Stone Mountain for a 
grand initiation ceremony. Five hundred men and women paid their ten dollars and 
joined the Klan. Thanks to newspaper advertisements, approximately two thousand 
spectators attended. The Klan lit up the countryside by placing fuel cans in the shape 
of a three hundred foot long cross on the slopes of the mountain. Dr. Samuel Green, a 
local physician who presided over the spectacle as Grand Dragon, proclaimed, "We 
are revived."75 
Green contended that his organization, which he called the Association of 
Georgia Klans (AGK), was the same Klan that had operated in Georgia since 1915. 
This meant that the Klan ~as operating under the 1915 Georgia charter which 
characterized the Klan as a purely benevolent and charitable fraternal order. During 
the next decade, unemployed reporter Stetson Kennedy would infiltrate the AGK and 
gather information that the government would use to revoke the Klan's charter. 
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Kennedy's goal in gathering evidence on the Klan was to persuade the state of 
Georgia to revoke the AGK's charter.76 Kennedy infiltrated the Klan and reported his 
fmdings in national periodicals such as The Nation, PM and Common Ground. 
Kennedy also fed infonnation to radio commentators and even the writers of 
Superman. During this time Kennedy was collecting information for a legal attack on 
the AGK. By 1954. Kennedy believed he had accumulated enough material evidence 
to take down the Georgia Klans. He extricated himself from membership and turned 
the evidence over to the Georgia Attomey General, who revoked the AGK' s charter. 
The downfall of the AGK splintered the Klan and allowed a wide array of 
more radical local leaders to gain autonomy. This generally enabled local groups to 
take a more violent approach to the problems that they perceived in their area. In 
Alabama, Asa Carter' s Original Ku Klux K lan of the Confederacy acquired a 
reputation for extreme violence. 77 With the national leadership chain destroyed, any 
local Klansman with enough support could set up an independent state organization. 
On a Monday morning in 1954, the Supreme Court unintentionally provided 
additional provocation for the spread of local Klans. The effect that the Brown 
decision had on race relations in the South cannot be overstated. 78 Segregationists 
formed White Citizens' Councils to prevent the enforcement of the Brown decision, 
while at the same time attempting to contain the spread of the Klan. "We want the 
people assured that there is responsible leadership organized which will and can 
76 Wade, 280. 
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handle local segregation problems. If that is recognized, there will be no need for any 
' hot-headed ' bunch to start a Ku Klux Klan."79 These Councils were supposedly non-
violent, respectable alternatives to the Klan. They drew well educated, prosperous 
segregationists and left the Klan with little membership other than violent, 
uneducated laborers. 80 
The Councils proved incapable of stopping the desegregation of the South, 
and many of their members sought more radical means. With the desegregation of 
Little Rock Public schools and the success of the Montgomery bus boycott in 1957, 
the Klan gained new members, many of whom sought publicity and conflict.81 These 
events allowed demagogues with no other talent than inciting the least educated and 
most virulently racist members of Southern society to commit acts of violence. 
The splintering of the Klan allowed leaders with little organizational or 
public-relations skills to claim the mantle of the Klan. In North Carolina, James 
"Catfish'' Cole set up the Carolina Knights. Cole had a checkered past riddled with 
problems with alcohol, driving and the law. He had previously earned a living as a 
carnival huckster and circus barker. Cole now proclaimed himself a Baptist minister, 
"I'm a minister of the Gospel," he declared, "and I'm here to tell you God's side: He 
never meant for niggers and whites to mix."82 Cole began holding rallies in southern 
North Carolina that drew thousands of spectators and participants. Cole also inserted 
79 Hodding Carter Ill, The South Strikes Back (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Lnc., 1959), 
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his opinion into local issues in an attempt to intimidate racial minorities who failed to 
conform to traditional Southern racial definitions. 
From the end of the Civil War through the 1950s, White Southerners used 
violence and the threat of violence to create and enforce racial restrictions. Robert 
Williams and the Lumbees both inverted this tradition by using violence to reject 
restrictions based on race. They also used violence to claim the rights of citizenship, 
including the right to retaliate against Willte violence. 
CHAPTER THREE 
"NEGROES WITH GUNS": 
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS AND THE MONROE GUN CLUB, 1955-7 
On October 5, 1957, Robert Williams, the President of the Monroe, North 
Carolina chapter of the NAACP, successfully defended the home of Monroe NAACP 
Vice President Dr. Albert E. Perry against an attack by a Klan motorcade. During the 
1950s, Williams and the Monroe NAACP developed a program of armed self-defense 
in order to resist White racial violence. This program attacked the heart of the racial 
system that Southern society had developed over the preceding century. Williams 
and the Monroe NAACP refused to defer to White authority, an obligation that 
Southern society required of Blacks. Williams also claimed for Black men the right 
to defend their homes, families and neighbors through violence and the threat of 
violence. By openly carrying arms, Williams hoped to prevent White violence 
towards himself and other Black residents of Monroe. Williams used armed self 
40 
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defense to redefine what it meant to be a Black man. 
By the time that Williams organized the Monroe NAACP, the South had an 
entrenched system of racial division and suppression that was based in pseudo-
science and social tradition. Social Darwinism, developed by Herbert Spencer in the 
1850s, mandated a virtual obsession with racial heritage based on the mistaken 
assumption that social traits were inherited through genetics. In the 1950s, the 
notions of Social Darwinism persisted in Southern racial beliefs. Spencer and his 
American disciples believed that the expression of an individual's racial composition 
could be observed in every area of a person's personality and appearance. Further, 
they believed that race determined the success of an individual, or groups of related 
individuals. These theories adapted Darwinism to the human social and racial sphere. 
Social Darwinists measured evolutionary success by the domination of one race over 
another. Using a pseudo-scientific sleight of hand, Southerners confounded socially 
constructed racial characteristics, such as intelligence, sexuality and aggressiveness, 
with the genetic expressions of skin color, facial features, hair, etc. By way of 
circular reasoning, European Americans used the fact of established white social, 
economic and political control of African Americans to justify the continuance of 
their social domination and the imposition of restrictive racial definitions upon 
minorities. 83 
83 Spencer, 7, 162-6. 
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Southern whites declared white blood to be the most pure due to the fact that 
White Americans had dominated and oppressed other races. European Americans 
claimed to be more intelligent, civilized and beautiful than members of other races. 
They beHeved that the height of white purity was to be found in Southern white 
women. The purity and delicacy of white women needed to be protected for the good 
of the children that they gave birth to and reared. Southerners believed black blood to 
be the least pure and they therefore conceptualized a correspondingly defective 
mentality. They imagined the prototypical African American to be childlike in 
temperament- impulsive, instinctual and accepting of their status as a lower caste. In 
the Southern conception, African Americans could either be helpful and polite or, by 
refusing their lesser status, become militant, demanding and "uppity."84 White 
Americans also imagined blacks to be more animalistic, passionate, promiscuous and 
more violent in their sexual practices. The possibility of contamination of white 
blood through miscegenation with lesser races posed the greatest danger for Southern 
society. Indeed, one drop of black blood was enough, in Arkansas and Alabama, for 
an individual to be considered black. 85 These beliefs, combined with the fear of the 
black man's supposed impulsive and aggressive sexuality, caused Southern society to 
develop an intense paranoia about black men raping or having sex with white 
women.86 In 1898, Democrats even used song to drive the scare tactics: 
84 Blu. 26. 
85 Haney-Lopez, 118. 
&6 Blu, 24-7; Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in 
the United States, 1880-191 7 {The University of Chicago Press, 1995) 28-9, 92; Glenda Elizabeth 
Rise ye sons of Carolina! 
Proud Caucasians, one and all; 
Be not deaf to Love's appealing-
Hear your wives and daughters call, 
See their blanched and anxious faces, 
Note their fi.·ail, but lovely forms 
Rise, defend their spotless virtue 
With your strong and ma nJy arms.87 
Democrats and other race-baiters goaded white men into violence by challenging 
them to demonstrate their manhood while simultaneously denying Black men the 
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ability to exercise the same manliness. 
Williams and the Monroe NAACP challenged these notions by claiming the 
right to defend their homes, families and communities through armed self-defense. 
Biographer Timothy B. Tyson suggests that an event that occurred in 1936 had sown 
the seeds of Williams' mi litancy. On a warm September afternoon, the eleven-year-
old Williams witnessed Jesse Alexander Helms (father of U.S. Senator Jesse Helms), 
a Monroe police officer, beat an African American woman and drag her down the 
street to the jail. Years later, Williams recalled that "The emasculated black men 
hung their heads in shame and hurried silently [away] from the cruelly bizarre 
scene."88 As an adult, Wil liams would strive to be the antithesis of these impotent 
Black men by protecting himself and other members of the African American 
Gilmore, Gender & Jim Crow: Women and the Politics of White Supremacy in North Carolina, 1896-
1920 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 92-3. 
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community from White violence. The suppression of a Black man's ability to protect 
a Black female was a major battlefield in the Southern racial system. 
Southern society intricately linked gender, especially the conception of 
manhood, with racial differentiation. In order for Southern White men to express their 
manhood, they had to protect Southern White women. For this reason, Southern 
society was obsessed with the Black man who was suspected (or imagined) to have 
raped a White woman. On the other hand, Southern society prohibited Black men 
from chaiJenging White men. Therefore, Black men could not protect Black women 
from White men. Further, the definition of Blackness included the compulsion to 
defer to authority. This entailed the inability of Black men to claim manliness by 
protecting Black women from attack. Through the lynching of the supposed rapist, 
White men further asserted not only their manliness, but also their Whiteness. The 
mob took possession of a Black man's body in order to define White manliness as 
able to protect White femininity. 89 Williams' generation grew up under the violent 
enforcement of racial restrictions. 
After this generation served in World War 11, many Black veterans refused to 
accept the segregation that they had grown up with. In 1955, Williams returned to 
Monroe from serving as a Private First Class in the United States Marine Corps.90 He 
found the local NAACP chapter dwindling due to White intimidation. Following the 
Brown decision, the Ku Klux Klan began a policy of gathering information on local 
89 Hale, 233-8. 
90 Tyson, Radio Free Dixie, 73. 
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NAACP members and terrorizing them with threats, cross burnings and economic 
reprisals.91 In Monroe, the chapter membership shrank to six, down fi·om a high of 
163 members in 1946.92 When Williams objected to disbanding it, the other members 
elected him President and, except for rus fellow veteran Dr. Albert E. Perry, promptly 
resigned. Williams began a drive for membership aimed at young veterans who had 
returned from the war to find no employment, or only menial work. "One day I 
walked into a Negro poolroom in our town," Williams recalled, "interrupted a game 
by putting NAACP literature on the table and made a pitch. I recruited half of those 
present."93 This sh ift in recruiting tactics reflected Williams' general strategy for the 
Monroe NAACP and the desire of the Black working class for an organization that 
would fight for their rights. 
Prior to Williams' assumption of leadership, the NAACP had been 
predominantly middle-class and moderate. By the 1950s, there was a growing feel ing 
in Southern Black communities that the NAACP was, as the novelist and intellectual 
Julian Mayfield put it, "doing too little, too timidly and too late." The national 
organization was unable to advocate militancy because that would jeopardize the 
financial and political support of most of their supporters, who preferred to address 
racial injustice through the legal and political systems.94 
9 1 Julian Mayfield, "Challenge to Negro Leadership: The Case of Robert Williams," Commentmy vol. 
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Williams developed an NAACP chapter that, because of its working-class 
composition and its militancy, was unrestrained by the concerns ofthe previous 
members or the national organization. Williams thought that the "most important" 
aspect of the Monroe chapter was that "we had a strong representation of returned 
veterans who were very militant and who didn't scare easy."95 Williams found it 
easier to recruit these working class members because they had more reason to 
challenge the status quo and less to lose from doing so. Williams remarked that "we 
got some of the 'worst element' we could find. They had been abused, they had been 
mistreated, they had been injail."96 ln addition, Williams solicited the support of 
working-class African American women and the financial support of those who could 
not join openly.97 
Will ian1s transformed the Monroe NAACP into an armed community defense 
orgaruzation. In 1 957 he wrote to the National Rifle Association and received a 
charter. The Monroe Rifle Club, which was affiliated with the Monroe NAACP, 
stockpiled weapons for def<::nse. 98 According to Williams, they started "getting really 
organized and setting up, digging foxholes and started getting up ammunition and 
training guys. In fact, we had started building our own rifle range, and we got our 
own M-1 's and got our own Mausers and German semi-automatic rifles, and steel 
95 Williams, 14. 
96 Robert F. Williams, Interview with Stephanie Banchero, transcript, 1996, Stephanie Banchero 
Papers, transcript, Madison, Wisconsin; quoted in Tyson, 81-82. 
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helmets. We had everything."99 Williams took advantage of every possible asset in 
constructing a militant group to aggressively challenge racism in Monroe. 
Williams and the Monroe Rifle Club accumuJated the materials to defend their 
homes and families. Southern racial codes had long suppressed the ability of Black 
men to violence to protect their communities. In defending the women and homes of 
Monroe, the NAACP attempted to redefine the category of the Black man. They 
claimed the right ofBlack men to defend their families and neighbors, through 
violence if necessary. Williams refused to defer to the authority of the White 
community when they attacked Black domesticity. 
During the summer of 1957, tensions increased as the Monroe chapter 
challenged the prohibition of Black chi ldren from the public swimming pool. The 
accidental drowning of a young African American who was forced to swim in a lake 
touched off this conflict. "Year after year, the summer months bring the same tragic 
story," Dr. Perry lamented in demanding access to a public swimming pool for 
Afi·ican Americans. 100 Wi)Liams and Perry began leading African American children, 
clad in bathing suits, to the publicly funded swimming pool to demand admission. 
When they were refused entrance, the contingent began a series of "stand-ins" at the 
entrance. During this time, Williams made a habit of openly carrying his .45 
99 Robert F. Williams, Interview with Robert Carl Cohen, transcript, 1968, Robert Carl Cohen Papers, 
box l ( 1968); quoted in Tyson, Radio Free Dixie, 88. 
100 Tyson, Radio Free Dixie, 83. 
48 
automatic in public.101 Even previously sympathetic Whites looked on this strategy 
with strong disapproval. 
In the fall of that year, Catfish Cole involved himself in the issue. "A nigger 
who wants to go to a white swimming pool is not looking for a bath," Cole intoned, 
"he is looking for a funeral." 102 Six Klan rallies drew thousands of participants, 
including a Klan -sponsored gathering of six thousand people in nearby Salisbury. 
After these events, Klan motorcades, accompanied by Monroe Chief of Police A.A. 
Mauney and several squad cars, frequently fired rounds into Dr. Perry's residence. In 
response, Williams and the Monroe NAACP set up a telephone alert system in 
preparation to defend their community. They also constmcted defensive positions 
around Dr. Perry's residence. Williams established a schedule for approximately 
sixty men to take shifts guarding Dr. Perry's house. They slept on cots in the garage 
with their rifles and shotguns. 103 
On October 5, 1957, Cole and Chief Mauney led a Klan motorcade past Dr. 
Perry's house. The Klan b~gan firing their weapons at the house. Williams and the 
Rifle Club returned the fire from behind breastworks constructed of sandbags and 
earth. The Monroe Rifle Club fired low and did not hit anyone in the passing cars. 
B.J. Winfield recalled that "when we started firing, they nm. We run them out and 
they started just crying and going on." The moral that Rifle Club member Woodrow 
10 1 Tyson, Radio Free Dixie, 86. 
102 Southern Regional Council, "North Carolina Ku Klux Klan Revival," appendix, 1957, f-red 
Alexander Papers, box 131, 4; quoted in Tyson, Radio Free Dixie, 86. 
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Wilson drew from the incident was that "The Klans was low-down people what 
would do dirty things. But if they found out that you would do dirty things, too, then 
they'd let you alone." The next day, the Monroe City Council banned Klan 
motorcades. 104 This success proved the efficacy of Williams' program of armed self-
defense. The city council moved to limit the disruption of the racial system by 
reducing Klan antagonism. 
This incident, one of many violent racial altercations in 1 950s Monroe, did not 
receive media attention, nor was the Klan held legally responsible for their actions as 
they were in Robeson County. Unlike the Lumbees, Williams and the Monroe 
NAACP only received press coverage from the Monroe Journal, and three African 
American publications. 105 According to Williams, 
The national press played up the Indian-Klan fight because they didn't 
consider this a great threat-- the Indians are a tiny minority and people could 
laugh at the incident as a sentimental joke-- but no one wanted Negroes to get 
the impression that this was an accepted way to deal with the Klan. So the 
white press maintained a complete blackout about [our] fight. 106 
The Monroe Gun Club refu~ed to passively accept the violent imposition of racial 
restrictions. However, Williams had contested the definition of Blackness, the White 
media deprived him of an opportunity to magnify the meaning of this victory through 
inattention to the event. They did so in order to contain any disruption to the 
Southern racial system. 
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Through violence, Williams challenged the racial restrictions of Union 
County. The Black community gained a new pride by proving their ability to stand 
together and defend their community from the harsher elements of segregation. In 
1961, Julian Mayfield reported that "the morale of the Negroes in Union County is 
high. They carry themselves with a dignity I have seen in no other Southern 
community ... It is as if, in facing up to their enemies, they have finally confronted a 
terrible reality and found it not so terrible after all." 107 Williams had replaced the 
tacit agreement between the White moderate community and the fo rmer middle-class 
leadership of the NAACP with a new reality in wruch the African American 
community in Monroe provided for its own security. 
This new arrangement brought with it new challenges. While Black workers 
now possessed a higher sense of security and autonomy, they found it harder to 
provide for their material and economic needs. After the failure of fear to regulate 
African American behavior, the White community turned to economic retribution. 
The business.community coerced factory owners in the area to import White labor 
from Charlotte rather than ruring local Blacks. 108 White employers had previously 
compensated their Black employees through a system that provided for their material 
needs without conceding to labor the right to act independently of White control. 
When Williams and the Monroe NAACP insisted that Blacks in Monroe were entitled 
107 Mayfield, 562. 
108 Mayfield, 562. 
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to the rights of citizenship, they negated the principles of this paternalistic system. 
Mayfield detailed the disruption of Black workers' personal economies: 
The leftover food that the colored maid could once carry home is now 
consigned instead to the garbage pail, and the old clothes that found their way 
to the colored section are now either sold or burned ... Negroes suspected of 
belonging to the NAACP are told "Let Williams feed you!" and " Let Wi ll iams 
find you a place to live!" as they are fired from their jobs and evicted from 
their homes. 109 
This made the Black community responsible for their material needs without the 
infrastructure to do so or the ability to create it. 
The White community also sought to suppress Williams' challenge through 
personal retribution. On August 28, 1961, a mob of 5,000 Whites beat a group of 
thirty Black non-violent protesters led by the Reverend Paul Brooks of the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and James Forman, the future leader of the 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). 110 That night, Williams and 
the Monroe NAACP engaged in a standoff with the White mob. A White couple 
named Mabel and Charles Bruce Stegell accidentally drove past the barricades and 
through the tense Black neighborhood. Mr. Stegall later recalled that "there were 
hundreds of niggers there, and they were armed, they were ready for war." Williams 
feared for their lives, especially after Mr. Stegall began ranting, "What's the matter 
with you niggers? Whatcha pointing those guns for?" 111 Mabel Stegell recalled that 
109 Mayfield, 562 .. 
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Williams "acted like he wanted to be nice to us." 112 The Stegalls followed Williams 
into his house, where they remained for several hours before being released. Fearing 
an all out race war, Williams fled Monroe. 
Local and federal authorities charged Williams with kidnapping the Stegalls. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in coordination with other federal and state 
authorities conducted a massive manhtmt for Williams and his family. J. Edgar 
Hoover, chief of the FBl, ordered "all divisions must continue to press the 
investigation to locate and apprehend Williams. All leads must receive immediate 
attention."113 Law enforcement exerted an extraordinary effort to apprehend 
Williams. 
WiJliams' connections in Monroe and elsewhere, through the NAACP, the 
Fair Play for Cuba Committee and the Socialist Workers Party enabled his flight. An 
FBI agent went so far as to say that Williams "has become something of a ' John 
Brown' to Negroes around Monroe and they will do anything for him."114 With his 
wife and two children in t<;>w, Williams fled to the outskirts of Monroe on foot. 
There, the Williams clan met Julian Mayfield, who drove them to New York City. 
The FBI turned up the pressure, pub! ishing wanted posters that warned that Williams 
"should be considered armed and extremely dangerous." They also inaccurately 
stated that Williams had been "diagnosed as a schizophrenic." Williams later 
112 Dwayne Walls, "She Begged for Freedom 'But They Wouldn' t Listen,"' Charlotte Observer 
(August 29, 1961); quoted in Tyson, Radio Free Dixie. 279. 
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described these posters as "tantamount to a 'shoot on sight' order." 115 Due to this 
pressure, Williams left the country for Toronto. After Williams had been in Canada 
for six weeks, the Canadian Mounted Police joined the search for him. "One day the 
Toronto Globe and Mail published a huge picture of me on its front page with an 
article stating that the U.S. govemment had asked Canada to arrest and extradite me," 
Williams later recalled. 116 When FBI agents and Mounties raided the Toronto 
apartment that Williams had stayed in, they confidently declared that Williams 
"hasn 't got a chance. We' ll send him back to the States in a pine box." 117 Williams 
fled to Nova Scotia, where, a week later, Cubans smuggled him onto a plane bound 
for his exile. 1 18 
From 1961 to 1965, Robert and Mabel Williams lived in Cuba and broadcast 
"Radio Free Dixie," a 50,000 watt radio program that could be heard as far as 
Canada.119 Every Friday at 11 pm., listeners across the country tuned in to hear 
music, news and political diatribes against the "rump-licking Uncle Toms and "Ku 
Klux Klan savages."120 Williams set the stage for future Black activism, and is often 
cited as an influential figure in the development of the Black Power movernent.12 1 
Malcolm X thought that "Robert Williams was just a couple of years ahead of his 
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time; but he laid a good groundwork, and he will be given credit in hi story for the 
stand that he took prematurely." 122 Two groups, the Revolutionary Action Movement 
(RAM) and the Republic ofNew Africa (RNA), named Williams president-in-exile 
(RAM in 1963 and RNA in 1968).123 Huey P. Newton, co-founder of the Black 
Panther Party, wrote that "reading Negroes with Guns by Robert Williams had a great 
influence on the kind of party we developed." 124 Interested White observers noted 
Williams' popularity with wariness. ln 1966, Life magazine reported that Williams's 
"picture is prominently displayed in extremist haunts in the big city ghettoes." 125 In 
1969, the CIA claimed that Williams "has long been the ideological leader of the 
Black Panther Party ... (and] has managed to becoming [sic] an outstanding figure, 
possibly the outstanding figure, in the black extremist movement in the United States . 
. . . One wonders if Williams is about to claim the center of the Black Power 
stage." 
126 
While historian Timothy B. Tyson suspects that this was an exaggeration, 
the fact that Williams influenced the development of the Black Power movement is 
cet1ain. 
Will ian1s demonstrated that a weJ !-organized group of Blacks could achieve 
the redefinition of racial meanings by asserting the right and ability of Black men to 
protect themselves, their families and their communities. This assertion ran counter 
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to the established Southern racial structure that defined Black men as incapable of 
asserting their manliness in opposition to Whites. However, Williams thereby 
provoked the reaction of White law enforcement and media outlets. White media 
outlets refused to broadcast the story of the Monroe Gun Club and thereby reduced 
the regional and national impact of Williams' challenge to White authority. The legal 
mechanisms of White power, in the form oflocal police and the FBI successfully 
made Williams a fugitive and forced him to flee to Cuba. Further, Whi te supporters 
of the NAACP forced the national organization to reject the ideology of its most 
militant branch. Despite these impediments, Williams' story inspired a generation of 
militant political activists because he used violence to redefine what it meant to be 
Black. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
"THIRTY THOUSAND HALF-BREEDS:" 
MAKING RACE IN ROBESON COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA, 1958 
Between the colonial era and the 1950s, North Carolinians developed a 
complex system of tripartite racial segregation that included Whites, Blacks and 
Indians. Through the various social negotiations, including violence, North 
Carolinians defined these three racial categories. While much of this history is lost, 
the known experiences of the Lumbee Indians of Robeson County illmninate tbe 
development and reformulation of this unique racial system. The Lumbees remained 
separate from their Black and White neighbors through their own volition. They 
consistently defined themselves as non-White and actively defended their unique 
status. ln 1958, when Cole's Klan attempted to subject them to restrictions placed on 
Blacks, the Lumbees used violence to define themselves as non-Black. 
56 
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The historical origins ofthe Lumbee are poorly documented and 
controversial. In 1885, historian Hamilton McMillan suggested that the Lumbees 
were descendents of Raleigh's lost colony. 127 The colony was planted on Roanoke 
Island, Virginia (now North Carolina) in the mid-summer of 1587. The settlers soon 
realized that they would not be able to plant a crop that year and sent Governor John 
White back to England to secure supplies. England's war with Spain, however, 
prevented White from returning until 1590. By this time, the colony had been 
abandoned. There had been previous discussion of moving the colony inland, and the 
settlers agreed to leave a carving to indicate where they had gone and to leave a cross 
if they were in danger upon leaving. White found inscriptions on several trees that 
read "CRO" and "CROA TOAN" and did not ftnd a cross. Upon making this 
discovery, White wrote "I greatly joyed that I had safely found a certain token of their 
being at Croatoan, which is the place where Manteo [a friendly member of the 
Hatteras tribe] was born, and the savages of the island our friend." 128 White searched 
briefly for the missing settlers, but the captain of the ship was anxious to chase 
Spanish bullion in the Caribbean and thus prohibited extensive investigation. 
Over the succeeding centuries, various travelers reported encountering, or 
hearing of, possible descendents of the lost colony. In 1608, Captain John Smith 
reported hearing oflndians in the Chowan-Roanoke area who dressed like 
127 Hamilton McMillan, Sir Walter Raleigh's Lost Colony (Wilson, NC: Advance Presses, 1888); cited 
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Englishmen. In 1660, the Reverend Morgan Jones claimed to have encountered 
Indians in North Carolina who spoke English. John Lederer, in 1670, reported that 
Santee and Cheraw Indians had informed him that "a powerful nation of bearded men 
[was] seated" in inland North Carolina. 129 Finally, Lumbee scholars Adolph L. Dial 
and David K. Eliades cite John Larson, the surveyor-general of North Carol ina, who 
wrote History of North Carolina in 1708. Lawson told of Indians who raised poultry 
and were familiar with the concept of writing. Dial and Eliades take this as a sure 
sign of contact with Europeans and speculate that this contact was with the Lost 
Colony. Lawson further reported that the "Hatteras Indians ... tell us, that several of 
their Ancestors were white People, and could talk in a Book." 130 Many of the early 
travelers' accounts are unconfirmed and contain a fair amount ofhearsay. 131 Further, 
by the time of Lawson's account, it is quite likely that Indians in inner North Carolina 
had encountered settlers who had left the colony of Virginia. By the late 1600s, class 
lines in Virginian society had become less permeable. The earliest settlers bad 
monopolized the land that was accessible by sbip. 132 Many younger men, upon their 
release from indentured servitude, found themselves with no opportunity to purchase 
fannland. The defeat of Bacon's Rebellion, the violent expression of these men's 
discontent, and the development of a cohesive gentry class produced further 
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motivation for the participants to flee the colony. 133 The Lumbees have since adopted 
this theory as their myth of national origin. 134 In 1888, the Lumbees applied for 
federal recognition as the Croatan Indians. 135 While it does seem possible that the 
Lumbees are descendents of the Lost Colony, there is little evidence to support a 
definitive claim. At any rate, the Lurnbees' mythical connection to the Lost Colony 
influences the way they think of themselves and often inspires White interest in 
them. 136 
Other theories as to the origins of the Lumbees abound. Anthropologist J.R. 
Swanton theorized that the "Croatan" Indians most likely descended from a variety of 
Siouan groups such as the Cheraw, Keyauwee, Eno, Shakori, Waccamaw and Cape 
Fear and possibly also from several Iroquoian groups.137 The Lurnbee themselves 
have, at various times, claimed to be Cherokee, Cheraw and Siouan. 138 Social 
Anthropologist Karen I. Btu suggests that extensive genealogical research might help 
132 T.H. Breen, "Horses and Gentlemen: The Cultural Significance of Gambling among the Gentry of 
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to clarify the history of the Lumbees, but a complete account ofLumbee history is 
most likely impossible. 139 
Oral traditions place the ancestors ofthe Lumbees in the area of Robeson 
County at least as early as 1732. In that year, George II of England granted two 
Lumbee ancestors, Henry Berry and James Lowrie, title to land on the Lowrie Swamp 
near the Lumber River. 140 Mary Norment, a White resident of Robeson County, 
wrote in 1875 that the first Scottish migrants, who arrived in the area in 1747, found 
the ancestors of the Lumbees already living there. 141 In 1754, the governor ofNorth 
Carolina, in his Colonial Reports, described "50 families a mixt Crew," which could 
refer to the ancestors of the Lumbees. The governor elaborated that these families 
were "a lawless People, [who] possess the Lands without patent or paying quit rents." 
They had "shot a Surveyor for coming to view vacant lands being inclosed in great 
swamps." The governor, though, also reported that there were "No ... Indians in the 
county." However, Blu suggests that the government officials were likely reluctant to 
investigate the race of people who had shot a tax collector. Finally, it may be, as Blu 
suggests, that the Lumbees by this time had mixed ancestry and had ceased to live 
what was considered a tribal lifestyle and therefore were not considered Indian. From 
1790 on, there is continuous documentation of the Lumbees' existence in Robeson 
139 Blu, 41-2. 
140 Blu, 35-36. 
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County. 142 The Lumbee people faced the encroachment of American settlement and 
the African American slaves who accompanied them. 
The residents of Robeson County in particular, and of the South in general, 
created a legal, intellectual and pseudo-scientific caste system based on race. During 
the Jim Crow period, the residents of Robeson County developed a three-way system 
of segregation to separate the races. By the 1950s Indians, African Americans and 
Whites had separate schools, restaurants and restrooms. In addition to de jure 
separation of the races, Robesonians developed a complex racial hierarchy based on 
the conflation of biological traits with acquired attributes. 
White American ideas about Indian blood followed a parallel course as with 
Blacks, but Indian genetics were viewed more positively than African genetics. 
Further, a significant amount of blood was necessary for an individual to be 
considered a "real Indian." Similar to their conception of Blacks, Whites saw two 
possibilities in Indians: the noble savage and the vicious savage. The first was seen 
as sullen, backward looking and melancholy. The less c ivilized type of Indian is 
characterized by his "meanness." He was overly sensitive to insult and quick with a 
violent reaction.143 A small amount of Indian blood could, in some cases, be positive. 
Especially popular was the Cherokee grandmother. A female Indian ancestor added 
an air of the exotic without provoking the fear of the violent Indian man. Cherokee 
heritage was especially popular because it provided a victin1 status while also relating 
142 Blu, 38-9. 
143 Blu, 25. 
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an individual to one of the "Five Civilized Tribes."144 Through their claims to 
Cherokee heritage and the Lost Colony, the Lumbees mitigated their Indian identity 
by claiming descent from White ancestry and the most noble of Indians. Thus, Indian 
heritage, and Lumbee heritage in particular, was treated as less desirable than White 
blood, but more desirable than African American heritage. As a result, Robeson ian 
society viewed the Indian race less negatively than the African race. 
In Robeson County, individual Lumbees remained part of a segregated group, 
at least in part, through their own volition. Lumbees exercised control over tribal 
membership in order to continue to defme themselves as neither White nor Black. 
Members of the community were Lumbees if one of their parents was a Lumbee and 
neither of their parents was Black. Beyond this, there is no distinction made between 
"half-bloods," "full-bloods," etc.145 Whites or non-Lumbee Indians who marry a 
Lumbee are accepted as contributing members of the community, but are not 
considered to be Lumbees. 146 It is probable that most Lumbees could have fully 
integrated into the White community if they had so desired. In physical appearance, 
Lumbees are often mistaken for Whites. 147 The Brass Ankles, Melungeons and 
Rockingham County Indians of North and South Carolina have renounced their 
Indian identity and have become socially recognized as White. The Lumbees could 
also have merged with the Black community, a possibility encouraged by Whites. In 
144 Bordewich, 66. 
145 Blu, 170. 
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Columbus County, North Carolina, members of the Indian community known today 
as the Waccamaw-Sioux split three ways: some became socially recognized Whites, 
others Blacks, while some retained their Indian status. 148 As a result of the Lumbees' 
desire to be socially considered neither White nor Black, they did not necessarily 
view segregation as a negative practice in and of itself. 
The Lumbees have remained Indian-separate from Whites and Blacks-
through a conscious, collective choice. The Lumbees fought constantly to gain and 
protect Indian schools in Robeson County. In 1921, the General Assembly ofNorth 
Carolina reacted to the demands of the Lumbees by passing "An Act for the 
Protection of the Indian Public Schools of Robeson County." This Act established an 
all-Indian committee and empowered it to resolve "all questions affecting the race of 
those applying tor admission to public schools of Robeson County for the Indian race 
only."149 In addition, the Lumbees lobbied for the expansion of the state college's 
institution at Pembroke. This exclusively Indian institution was established in 1926 
as a Normal school. In 1940, the college awarded its first Bachelor's degrees and, in 
1941, the state changed the name of the school to Pembroke State College for Indians. 
Thus, the Lumbees exerted considerable effort to define of themselves as a racially 
Indian group, distinct from the White and Black communities. 
148 Blu, 182-3. 
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Following World War II, many Lumbee veterans bitterly objected to racial 
restrictions upon their return to the South. One Lumbee veteran related his 
experiences to Lumbee scholars Adolph L. Dial and David K. Eliades: 
I went to a square dance in a neighboring town with some Indian and White 
friends. As I stood in line to get tickets, a policeman looked me over. He 
finaJly walked up to me and asked, "Are you an Indian?" to which 1 proudly 
repl ied yes. He then said, "Well , you can't go in." ... I couldn't help but 
wonder how I could be free everywhere except at home. 150 
In addition to discriminating against Indians, Whites in North Carolina further 
restricted Indians from Robeson County for being Lurnbee. Another veteran of 
WWII described his pursuit of a college education: 
64 
In 1945 or '46, r applied to UNC. I had six battle stars. They said they didn 't 
accept Indians from Robeson County ... Indians from the West could come 
here and go to school, but here we are living here right in the state, taxpayers 
and aJl, and we can't go. 151 
Many Lumbee veterans deeply resented the contradictory system that demanded that 
Indians serve in the military while discriminating against them at home. 
The racial situation in Robeson County was exceptionally complex, but was 
much less violent than in other areas of the South. Following the end of federal 
endorsement of segregation in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, there was no 
violent, racially motivated resistance to the decision. Robesonians displayed none of 
the racial hysteria, race-baiting or organized resistance that occurred in other areas of 
the South.152 As anthropologist Karen I. Blu suggests, Whites did not possess a 
150 B tu, L56. 
151 Btu, 86. 
152 Btu, 190. 
common group identity based on a shared history and culture. 153 Indeed, Robeson 
County contained small Jewish and Greek communities that were very active in 
business and politics.154 The White (mainJy Scottish highlander) majority often 
denigrated these minorities through negative ethnic defmitions, even while 
considering them White. As a result, these minorities have generally exercised a 
moderating influence on race relations. 
White community leaders of Robeson County often restrained White 
dissidents who promoted a more repressive form of segregation. In 1952, federal , 
state and local authorities had united to arrest and prosecute members ofthe Klan 
operating in Robeson and bordering Columbus County. More than seventy-five 
Klansmen were convicted and sentenced to pay fines or serve prison terrns. 155 This 
ended Klan activity in the area for the next six years. 
On January 13, 1958, the Klan resurfaced in Robeson County. James 
"Catfish" Cole of Marion, South Carolina, led his fellow Klansmen across the state 
line. The Klan burned one cross outside of a house in Lumberton, where a Lumbee 
family had moved into a house that had been occupied by Whites. They burned a 
second cross outside of a home in the town of St. Pauls (on the outskirts of 
Pembroke) whose White owners were housing a Lumbee woman.156 According to 
Cole, the Klan gave the Lumbee woman "a warning" because she was "having an 
153 B lu, 192. 
154 Blu, 190-1. 
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affair" with a White man. Cole elaborated, "There's about 30,000 half-breeds in 
Robeson County and we are going to have a cross burning and scare them up."157 
Cole attempted to lease land in or near Pembroke, but was refused by local residents. 
On Thursday, January 16, the Klan announced that they would hold a large rally and 
cross burning on Saturday, January 18, in Maxton (ten miles west ofPembroke). 158 
Cole predicted that five thousand Klansmen would attend to "put the Indians in their 
place [and] end race-mixing."159 When interviewed by the Gaffney Ledger about 
Cole's statements, Lumbee veteran Simeon Oxendine responded, "He said that, did 
he? Well, we'll just wait and see."160 Sheriff Malcolm McLeod visited Cole at his 
residence in South Carolina and ''told him that his life would be in danger if he came 
to Maxton and made the same speech he'd been making." 161 Even before the event, 
the local White community worked to avoid disruption of the racial order. 
At twilight on Saturday, January 18, approximately one hundred Klansmen 
gathered around a speaking platform in the field in Maxton. They had brought a 
generator, which powere9 a sound system and a solitary light bulb. Approximately 
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one-fourth ofthem were armed with rifles and shotguns. 162 Above them, they 
stretched a banner emblazoned with the initials "KKK." Across the road, Lumbees 
were arriving several cars at a time. Most were carrying handguns, shotguns or rifles. 
Several Lwnbee soldiers who had returned home from local military bases brought 
"bushel-baskets ful l of' grenades, "just in case."163 By 8:30pm., when the rally was 
scheduled to begin, there were approximately one hundred Klansmen and hundreds of 
Lumbees. 164 Sheriff McLeod, warned Cole against speaking: "Well, you know how it 
is. I can't control the crowd with the few men I've got. l'm not telling you not to 
hold a meeting, but you see how it is. You've leased the land and have a right to be 
here, but you see how it is." 165 According to one Lumbee woman interviewed by 
anthropologist Karen Blu, several Lumbees asked the sheriff to tell Cole that they 
would kill him if he spoke. 166 While the sheriff was speaking with Cole, Lumbees 
began advancing toward the Klan from three sides, leaving onJy the adjacent wetland 
unguarded. Suddenly, someone shot out the light bulb and chaos erupted across the 
field. In the ensuing melee, shots were fired "every which way," and enraged 
Lumbees chanted "God Damn the Ku Klux Klan." 167 The Lumbees destroyed the 
sound system while the Klan fled into the swamps and the sheriff and his deputies 
162 
"Raid by 500 Indians Balks North Carolina Klan Rally," New York Times (January 19, 1958), I. 
163 Blu, 157; Sider, I 02. 
164 The number of Klansmen was estimated to be between 75 and the number of Lumbees was 
estimated to be 350 in " Indians: The Natives are Restless.'' 20. However, S ider, on page I 0 I states 
that 150 Klansmen and between l ,500 and 3,000 Lumbees participated. Other estimates fall within 
this range. 
165 Dial and Eliades, 160. 
166 Blu, 157. 
167 Dial and Eliades, 156. 
68 
"disappeared into their cars" and radioed the state highway patrol. 168 Lumbee veteran 
Simeon Oxendine tore down the KKK banner, wrapped himself in it and posed for 
pictures that would appear around the world in Life magazine. The Lumbee also 
burned the Klan' s cross, hanged an effigy of Cole and called in vain for Cole to show 
himself. 169 Cole's wife, abandoned by her chivalrous husband, drove the family's 
aging Cadillac into a djtch while trying to turn it around and escape. After the 
shooting stopped, a group of Lumbees pushed the car back onto the road for her. 170 
By one account, Cole remained in fearful seclusion in the swamp for two days. 171 
According to another report~ two sheriffs deputies, wearing civilian clothes, 
dispersed the remaining crowd with a tear gas bomb, which "sen[t) choking, weeping 
Indians and Klansmen alike into the bushes or toward their cars."172 By yet another 
account, Sheriff McLeod took the microphone and announced that if everyone did not 
leave at once, they would miss "Gunsmoke." 173 Remarkably, no one was k illed and 
only four people received minor injuries. 174 Historian Tim Tyson reports that falling 
bullets caused all but one of these injuries. 175 Historical anthropologist Gerald Sider, 
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however, states that a reporter was wounded when a bullet struck his camera and that 
he was the "only person even slightly wounded: '176 
The Lumbees' collective memory of this event depicts the nation acting in 
unity against the imposition of a violent, foreign ethos. A Lumbee woman 
interviewed by Blu stated that "outside agitators from South Carolina" had provoked 
the incident. 177 She described Cole as believing that because " in South Carolina they 
don't have such things ... , they shouldn' t here either."178 White residents supported 
the Lumbees in protecting their intricate and unique tripartite racial system. 
White judicial and governmental authorities sided with the Lwnbees. On 
January 20, a grand jury indicted Cole and James Garland Martin, a tobacco plant 
worker arrested after the rally for drunkenness and carrying a concealed weapon, on 
charges of inciting a riot. While Martin was already in custody, Cole failed to turn 
himself in and was declared a fugitive from justice. 179 On January 22, Assistant 
Judge Lacy Maynor, a Lumbee Indian, fined Martin $74.75 after he was convicted of 
public drunkenness and possession of concealed weapons. Upon returning from a 
vacation cruise on January 30, 1958, North Carolina Governor Luther H. Hodges 
asserted that the responsibility for the conflict " rests squarely on the iiTesponsible and 
misguided men who call themselves the Ku Klux Klan." 180 As reported by the New 
York Times, Cole fought a losing battle against extradition, "on the ground that his 
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life would be in jeopardy if he returned here." On March 13, an all-White, all-male 
jury deliberated for only forty-three minutes before convicting Martin and Cole of 
inciting a riot. The next day, Judge Clawson L. Williams sentenced Cole to eighteen 
to twenty-four months in prison and Martin to six to twelve months. 181 While the 
judicial system acted in a responsible manner, the reaction of the press was much 
more ambiguous. 
The extensive press coverage of this event focused on the dramatic aspect of 
the event rather than exploring the implications for, or describing the intricacies of, 
the delicate racial climate of the South. In many cases, it would appear that reporters 
were writing about a late-nineteenth century Indian war. One New York Times 
editorial opened, "The Indian war whoop still brings terror to a little band of settlers 
in Robeson County." 182 Such language was meant to invoke the history of White 
settlement of the frontier, even though Whites constituted the largest racial group in 
Robeson County. The Newsweek special stated that the Lumbees "gave the U.S. the 
first war-whooping, gun-:shooting Indian raid it had seen in 50 years and more." 183 
TIME entitled its piece on the Lumbec "The Natives Are Restless." 184 The authors 
used this terminology in order to stir the emotion of a public that still romanticized 
the frontier and the conflici with Indians that it entailed. The fact that the Lumbees 
did not pose a threat to the White majority made the story even better. 
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In their accounts, some journalists described the Klan as a morally neutral, 
rather than a brutal, expression of the violent Southern system of racial segregation 
and repression. Newsweek accepted the system of segregation in Robeson County as 
the inevitable outcome of the presence of three races: "The existence here of the three 
races has led to a triple-way segregation system."185 The only moral that Life drew 
from the story was that, like Custer, "the Klan bad taken on just too many Tndians."186 
Others merely marveled at the foolishness of Cole's franchise of the Klan . The 
Commonweal remarked that "it is rare that even the Klan has its stupidity so blatantly 
exposed."187 The New York Times sarcastically editorialized that the Lumbees were 
"inconsiderate to startle the pathetic covey ofKluxery, who, like all sneaks and 
bullies, are easily scared."188 National reporters celebrated the Lumbee victory over 
the Klan through derision of Cole and his followers. 
However, the media made it clear that the example of the Lumbees was not 
applicable to the Blacks of the region. The New York Times tapped this vein of 
thought when it reported. that "the residents [of Maxton] are afraid others will get the 
wrong idea." They were "concem[ ed] that some observers might get the idea that 
they are opposed to segregation just because they don't like the Klan. And that 
wouldn't be true."189 Journalists and local residents did not wish to theorize on the 
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future of African Americans in North Carolina, nor did they wish to consider the 
implications of the Lurnbee victory for Black resistance. 
The incident with the Klan actually improved the racial climate in Robeson 
County. The Lumbees were overjoyed with their victory and were impressed by the 
lack of support given to Cole by local Whites. Both Indians and Blacks were pleased 
with the operation of the local law enforcement and courts. After the announcement 
of Cole's conviction, Simeon Oxendine remarked "I think the Indians are satisfied 
with the judgment."190 However, an underlying current of conflict between African 
Americans and the Lumbees was evident. Immediately fo llowing the riot, Oxendine 
expressed his belief that "if the Negroes had done something like this a long time ago, 
we wouldn't be bothered with the KKK." 191 Oxendine had not heard of Robert F. 
Williams or the Monroe Gun Club, despite the fact that Monroe was only eighty 
miles away. 
Due to their defeat of the Klan, the Lumbees maintained the racial balance of 
Robeson County. The White community actively participated in this process through 
the media, law enforcement and judiciary. Despite the fact that they did not receive 
the same level of support, Robert Williams and the Monroe NAACP did not receive 
the attention that changed the racial paradigm in Union County. Further, Williams 
had a considerable effect on national racial debate through Radio Free Dixie and his 
in'fluence on the leaders of SNCC and the Black Power movement. Williams and the 
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violence to attack racial repression. 
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In the case of the Lurnbees, the local and national Whlte community 
interpreted violence against the Ku Klux Klan as a strike against the disruption of the 
racial status quo. Conversely, in reaction to Robert Williams, the White community 
united behind the Klan in suppression of African American dissent. Whites reacted 
differently to the two incidents because the Lumbees and the Monroe NAACP were 
fighting for two very different goals. The Lumbees resisted the Klan's importation of 
foreign racial assumptions in order to defend the unique racial structure of Robeson 
County. The local, state and national White communi ty supported the Lumbees by 
publicizing their victory and prosecuted the Klan for the incident. Conversely, Robert 
Williams attacked the racial order in Monroe, North Carolina. In response, the 
national media ignored the event and the local and national law enforcement pursued 
charges against Williams. In both cases, the moderate White majority used its 
influence to minimize the disruption to the racial situation by ostracizing radical 
factions. 
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